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During the past few years, a new generation of historians have turned their
attention to the influence of law, public policy, and public administration
in American life in the period between 1787 and 1835. The purpose of this
essay is to highlight the contributions of these scholars in the hope that
such an inquiry can further the ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue on
American political development between historians, political scientists, and
historical sociologists. It is not my intention to survey in an exhaustive
fashion the existing body of historical writing on governmental institutions
in the early republic or to compare this literature with related scholarship
on other eras. Rather, I treat the period between 1787 and 1835 as a single
epoch and consider its significance as a formative period in the history of
American public life.
It would be misleading to assume that this new scholarship marks an
entirely new departure in American historiography. The history of govern-
mental institutions in the early American republic, after all, has long been a
major concern of a distinguished galaxy of historians and political scientists
that range from Henry Adams and Leonard D. White to Paul Wallace Gates
*Of the many individuals who have helped me sort out the ideas in this essay, I should like
particularly to thank Andrew R. L. Cayton, Colleen A. Dunlavy, Robert P. Forbes, William J.
Novak, Peter S. Onuf, Jack N. Rakove, Daniel Scott Smith, Benson Stein, Gordon S. Wood,
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Alfred F. Young, and two anonymous referees for Studies in American
Political Development. None of these individuals, of course, are responsible for what I have done
with their good advice. I am also indebted to Karen Orren for editorial suggestions that have
improved the text. Earlier versions were presented at the Newberry Library's seminar in social
history and at the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. I am especially
grateful to the Wilson Center for financial assistance in the preparation of an earlier draft.
©1997 Cambridge University Press ISSN 0898-588X/97 $7.50 + .10 347
348 RICHARD R. JOHN
and Harry N. Scheiber.1 During the past few decades, however, revisionist
historians and political scientists have questioned the importance that
these scholars and the many who followed their lead assigned to these
institutions. The first section below focuses on how and why these revision-
ists discounted the role of governmental institutions in the early republic.
The second considers how a new generation of historians is reviving long-
neglected institutional themes, with a special focus on national public
administration, state and local government, federalism, and the separation
of powers. My thesis is that these younger historians share the insight that
governmental institutions can be agents of change, and that this perspec-
tive can help frame a more realistic, coherent, and inclusive account of the
American past.
The early republic has long been recognized as a formative era in American
political development. No period in American history, writes Gordon S.
1. Henry Adams's most important historical writing is his History of the United Stales, 9 vols.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889-1891), a survey of public administration during the
presidencies of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Leonard D. White's principal works on
governmental institutions in the early republic are The Federalists: A Study in Administrative
History (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948); The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History,
1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951); and The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History, 1829-1861 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954). For an overview of White's contribution
to American historical writing, see Richard R.John, "Leonard D. White and the Invention of
American Administrative History," Reviews in American History 24 (June 1996): 344-60.
Paul Wallace Gates's major works include The Farmers's Age: Agriculture, 1815-1860 (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), and History of Public Land Law Development (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968). Several of Gates's essays have been brought
together in The Jeffersonian Dream: Studies in the History of American Land Policy and Development,
ed. Allan G. Bogue and Margaret Beattie Bogue (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico
Press, 1996). For a sampling of the work of Gates's students, see David M. Ellis, et al. eds., The
Frontier in American Economic Development: Essays in Honor of Paul Wallace Gates (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1969). For an introduction to Gates's legacy, see Bogue and Bogue,
"Introduction," ix-xx, and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Economic Historian as Realist and as
Keeper of Democratic Ideals: Paul Wallace Gates's Studies of American Land Policy," Journal of
Economic History 40 (September 1980): 585-93. Recent works that build on Gates's legacy
include Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Bonne to
Henry Clay (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and
Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier', 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1990); and id., William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the
Frontier of the Early American Refmblic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).
Harry N. Scheiber's publications include Ohio Canal lira: A Case Study of Gcwernment and the
Economy, 1820-1861, 2d ed (1968; Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987); "The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts," Perspectives in
American History 5 (1971): 329-402; "Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States, 1789-1910," Journal of Economic History 33 (March 1973): 232-
51; "Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910," Law and Society Review 10 (Fall
1975): 57-118; "American Constitutional History and the New Legal History: Complementary
Themes in Two Modes," Journal of American History 68 (September 1981): 337-50; "Regulation,
Property' Rights, and the Definition of 'The Market': Law and the American Economy, "Journal
of Economic History 41 (March 1981): 103-11; and "Public Rights and the Rule of Law in
American Legal History," California Law Review 72 (March 1984): 217-51.
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Wood, in a recent historiographical survey, witnessed more "headline events,"
giving political history an "overriding influence" in most scholarly accounts.2
During these years, public figures invented the mass party, hastened the
creation of a national economy, and established many of the governmental
institutions that remain important today. Each of these developments
helped to give the period its distinctive character, as did the many enduring
political writings of contemporaries.
Yet even though - or, perhaps, because - the early republic is so familiar,
it is often misunderstood. It has, for example, become customary for schol-
ars to contend that the central government sank into relative insignificance
following the defeat of the Federalists in the election of 1800; that the
polity between 1800 and 1828 is adequately characterized as a "state of
courts and parties"; and that the rise of thejacksonian party in the election
of 1828 was a product of more fundamental changes originating in the
wider society outside of the political realm. Each of these assertions is
challenged by the recent scholarship this essay surveys.
The neglect of governmental institutions by historians of the early repub-
lic followed logically from the premises of two related, yet distinct, tradi-
tions within American historiography: the "new" social history, with its
preoccupation with ordinary people; and the "new" political history, with
its focus on electoral behavior.3 In addition, it drew on the widely shared
conviction that major political developments, including those involving
governmental institutions, were best understood as the product of anteced-
ent social causes.
The central project of the new social history, at least as it has been
practiced in the United States, has been the recovery of the lived experi-
ences of previously neglected groups such as blacks, women, and the poor.
Its leading practitioners hoped to move beyond the study of political phe-
nomena, which they typically dismissed as superficial and ephemeral, and
to write American history "from the bottom up."4 Historians writing from
2. Gordon S. Wood, "The Significance of the Early Republic," Journal of the Early Republic 8
(Spring 1988): 4.
3. Other historiographical traditions that neglect the role of governmental institutions
include the "new" economic history and modernization theory. The new economic history,
whose leading practitioners include Robert William Fogel and Douglass C. North, once re-
garded law, public policy, and public administration as irrelevant to the study of market ratio-
nality and economic growth. Recently, however, both Fogel and North have turned their atten-
tion to governmental institutions. See, for example, Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or
Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989); and
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990). The best known application of modernization theory to the
history of the period is Richard D. Brown, Modernization: The 'Transformation of American Life,
1600-1865 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976). Though Brown touched on institutional develop-
ments, particularly in communications, he was ultimately more concerned with changing
modes of cultural expression. For a critique, see James A. Henretta, " 'Modernization': Toward a
False Synthesis," Reviews in American History 5 (December 1977): 445-52.
4. Useful introductions to the new social history include Alice Kessler-Harris, "Social Histo-
ry," in The Neio American History, ed. Eric Foner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990),
163-84; Peter N. Sterns, "Toward a Wider Vision: Trends in Social History," in The Past Before Us:
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this perspective, as one astute chronicler of the new social history has j
observed, "assume that political decisions affect social existence" yet "em- ]
phasize the degree to which the social system shapes the character of ;
political institutions."5 All held, either explicitly or implicitly, that society -
rather than the polity or the culture — was the most appropriate unit of
analysis. When they turned their attention to courts, legislatures or admin-
istrative bodies, they focused less on their social effects than on their em-
beddedness in the broader environment. Fewer still accorded major politi-
cal events, such as the framing of the federal Constitution or the
establishment of state or central governments, an independent role as
agents of change. None assigned much causal significance to structural
features of the American polity, such as federalism or the separation of
powers. By focusing on behavior and social relations - as Robert F. Berk-
hofer, Jr., explained - the new social historians affirmed their faith in the
concept of society as the "key to understanding the structure of American
history."6
The new social historians' understanding of the relationship between
politics and social change had an unmistakable affinity with the behavioral-
ist methodology so influential among political scientists and sociologists
during the 1960s and 1970s. This was true even though, at the time, the
relationship between the new social history and behavioralism was far from
self-evident. Few new social historians shared the behavioralists' confidence
in quantification, and many rebelled against the behavioralists' preoccupa-
tion with equilibrium models of social change. Yet both treated political
events as the reaction of social groups to behavioral stimuli; both assumed
that the public sphere was little more than the arena in which various social
groups jostled for advantage; and both took more-or-less for granted the
existence of this public sphere, as well as the coherence of the society over
which it presided.
Emblematic of the new social historians' approach to the relationship of
politics and social change was Paul Johnson's Shopkeeper's Millennium, an
imaginative and frequently cited study of religious revivalism in upstate
New York. Like many new social historians, Johnson traced the origins of
political conflict to the local community, an approach nicely revealed by his
handling of the Sabbath mails controversy, a major national political issue
during the 1820s. From Johnson's perspective, this issue had little intrinsic
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1980), 205-30; and James A. Henretta, "Social History as Lived and Written,"
American Historical Review 84 (December 1979): 1293-322.
5. James A. Henretta, "Comment," American Historical Review 84 (December 1979): 1331.
6. Robert F. Berkhofer, "Comment," American Historical Review 84 (December 1979): 1326.
For a related discussion that focused specifically on the colonial period, see Joyce Appleby, "A
Different Kind of Independence: The Postwar Restructuring of the Historical Study of Early
America," William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 50 (April 1993): 245-67. Appleby s theme was the
centrality of the concept of society to recent scholarship on colonial America. "Investing the
typical conditions of everyday existence with an importance they had never known before,"
Appleby wrote, "historians made society - its geographic setting, its enduring traditions, its
productive and reproductive activities - the central focus of historical research" (ibid., 250).
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significance. Merchants opposed the transportation of the mail on the
Sabbath not because of genuine moral qualms, but because strict Sabbath
observance helped force unruly artisans to adopt middle-class ways. That
the causal arrows might be reversed - and that the Sabbatarian protest
might have been prompted by extra-local circumstances that forced a con-
frontation at the local level - was a possibility that Johnson did not feel
necessary to explore in any detail.7
Equally dismissive in their approach toward governmental institutions
were the leading practitioners of the new political history, also sometimes
called the ethnocultural school. Like new social historians, ethnocultural-
ists sought to write American history from the standpoint of ordinary
people. The lived experiences of the rank-and-file, or so they assumed, held
the key to explaining events once mistakenly ascribed to the machinations
of elites. No longer would political accounts remain preoccupied with law,
public policy, and public administration, or revolve around the delibera-
tions of generals, diplomats, judges, and public administrators.
To hasten this reorientation, new political historians focused on the
electoral process. In the early republic, a large percentage of Americans -
including the overwhelming majority of white adult men - had the right to
vote. Voting, in fact, could plausibly be described as the only political activity
that routinely involved a sizable fraction of the population. By statistically
correlating electoral data with a variety of social indicators such as religion,
ethnicity, or wealth, new political historians hoped to explain not only why
Americans voted as they did, but also what they believed, on the assump-
tion that electoral data was one of the few sources of information about the
main currents of American culture.8 To interpret the polling data, new
political historians relied on highly sophisticated quantitative techniques
and imported from behavioralistic political scientists the assumption that
social circumstances held the key to political change.
The most notable conclusion to emerge from the new political histo-
rians' research was their discovery that cultural indicators such as ethnic
background or religious affiliation were more likely to be correlated with
voting data than economic indicators such as wealth. A few new political
historians, to be sure, remained convinced that, at least in certain elections,
economic issues loomed uppermost. This was particularly true in elections
7. Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York,
1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 83-88. For a critique, see Richard R. John,
Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995), chap. 5, esp. 324 n.55, 326 n.86.
8. Surveys of the new political history include Richard J.Jensen, "Historiography of Ameri-
can Political History," in Encyclopedia of American Political History (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1984), ed. Jack P. Greene, 1-25; and Allan G. Bogue, "The New Political History in the
1970s," in Past Before Us, 231-51. For a recent update, see Ronald P. Formisano, "The Invention
of the Ethnocultural Interpretation," American Historical Review 99 (April 1994): 453-77.
The assumption that political history is a branch of social history has become so wide-
spread that at least one political historian felt it incumbent to remind his readers that his
monograph was not a work of social history. Andrew R. L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology
and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986), 185.
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that followed major economic downturns, such as the election of 1840,
which began shortly following the Panic of 1837.9 But most concluded that,
for the bulk of the electorate, cultural issues were the overriding concern.
Political insiders might pay close attention to where a candidate stood on
banking or internal improvements. Ordinary voters, however, were more
likely to be swayed by a candidate's position on Sabbatarianism or tem-
perance. A skeptic might conclude that the electorate rarely exerted much
influence on public policy, since cultural questions only rarely came up for
debate and almost never dominated the legislative agenda. But most new
political historians contented themselves with exploring the kaleidoscopic
array of cultural concerns that agitated ordinary Americans at the grass
roots.
Given the new political historians' preoccupation with the social basis
of electoral behavior, it is not surprising that they devoted little attention
to law, public policy, or public administration. Consider, for example,
Ronald P. Formisano's Transformation of Political Culture, a detailed study of
political change in Massachusetts in the half century following the framing
of the federal Constitution. Formisano was by no means oblivious to the
role of governmental institutions in American life: indeed, he was among
the first historians to link government-supported innovations in transporta-
tion and communications with the rise of the mass party. "Amid many kinds
of changes," he wrote, "those associated with what historians have called
the transportation and communications 'revolutions' probably did the
most to create the technical potential for mass political organizations."10
Yet Formisano's primary concern was not governance, but, rather, the
dramatic increase in popular interest in national politics that historians
have long associated with the ascendancy of the Jacksonians in the 1820s.
Formisano demonstrated convincingly that this development owed less to
party behavior than many historians had previously assumed. In certain
settings, Formisano conceded, the organizational efforts of party leaders
might have some independent effect on voting levels. For the most part,
however, political parties were a "dependent variable" shaped in the short
run by political events and in the long run by changing social circum-
stances and communications technology.11
Because Formisano's subject was the political party, he, quite under-
standably, did not find it incumbent to consider these other phenomena in
any detail. Still, his study did help to redirect scholarship on the early
republic away from parties and toward a range of topics that recent politi-
cal historians have neglected. After all, as he persuasively demonstrated, in
9. Michael F. Holt, "The Election of 1840, Voter Mobilization, and the Emergence of the
Second American Party System: A Reappraisal of Jacksonian Voting Behavior," in A Master's Due:
Essays in Honor of David Herbert Donald, ed. William J. Cooper, Jr., Michael F. Holt, and John
McCardell (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 16-58. For a critique, see
Ronald P. Formisano, "The New Political History and the Election of 1840," journal of Inter-
disciplinary History 23 (Spring 1993): 661-82.
10. Ronald P. Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties,
1790s-lH40s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 16.
11. Ibid., 41.
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this period parties played little direct role in shaping either public policy or
the distribution of wealth.12
The new political historians' neglect of public policy prompted criticism
even from historians broadly sympathetic to their approach. Historians
who confined themselves to the study of voting patterns, declared Richard L.
McCormick, in a judicious survey of scholarship in this vein, solved, at
most, only half the puzzle. This was because, in the early republic, parties
were not "responsible" bodies whose organizers sought to enact legislation
that reflected their public positions on the major issues of the day. Rather,
they were electoral machines dedicated to securing public office and the
perquisites of power. What did it matter, McCormick mused, if the elector-
ate was more frequently influenced by cultural than economic appeals?
How did this explain what the government did?13
McCormick urged political historians to shift their angle of vision from
elections to policymaking and to make their primary theme the study of
governance. This McCormick understood to embrace not only the framing
of public policy and the rules and procedures for "getting and using the
power of the state," but also the popular expectations that Americans held
about what government ought to do.14 The "motive force" behind political
change in the nineteenth-century United States, McCormick speculated,
might well be the prior emergence of a "new vision of government," a
conclusion of the "first importance."15 To advance this debate, there was an
"urgent need for a satisfactory typology of governmental policies, for new
methods of describing and categorizing those policies, and for new ways of
identifying the significant governmental transformations in American his-
tory." The study of governance, McCormick hoped, might in this way be-
come as systematic as the study of elections.16
McCormick's critique raised the intriguing possibility that governmental
institutions might be as significant as social circumstances in explaining
how American politics evolved. But, like the new political historians, he
found this notion problematic. Government might be central to the politi-
cal process, McCormick conceded, yet public policy still derived "funda-
mentally" from the social setting, rather than from past politics or institu-
tional arrangements.17 Nowhere was this more true than in the early
republic, when public policy was "little more than the accumulation of
isolated, individual choices, usually of a distributive nature."18 This was
even true, McCormick added, in those states that experimented with eco-
nomic planning in the transportation sector, since these projects ultimately
fell victim to sectional rivalry and interest-group competition. Only later,
12. Ibid., 316-20, 342.
13. Richard I.. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of
Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14-15. "The most
important message conveyed by ethnocultural analysis," McCormick wrote, "is not that voters
were ethnically and religiously motivated, but that grass-roots concerns are so irrelevant to
public policymaking" (ibid., 56).
14. Ibid., 18. 15. Ibid., 131-32. 16. Ibid., 87.
17. Ibid., 19. 18. Ibid., 206.
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well after the Civil War, would public policy assume a more coherent and j
programmatic form.19 ]
Joining the new social and political historians in downplaying govern- i
mental institutions in the early republic were many historians who resisted :being identified with these traditions, but who adopted a similar approach !
to the relationship between politics and social change. Of these, few have •
proved more influential than social historians Oscar and Mary Flug Hand-
lin and political scientist Louis Hartz. In the 1940s, both the Handlins and
Hartz published major studies of nineteenth-century economic policy in
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, respectively, that buttressed the idea that
the major political developments in the early republic were best under-
stood as products of antecedent social causes.
It has long been recognized that the Handlins and Hartz - and also the
Social Science Research Council (SSRC), which subsidized their research -
intended their studies to help legitimize the major expansion of govern-
ment economic involvement that accompanied the New Deal. The Hand-
lins and Hartz predicated their research on the assumption that previous
studies of nineteenth-century government economic policy had mistakenly
concentrated on the federal government, overlooking the far more impor-
tant promotional activities that governmental institutions had performed
in the individual states. By increasing public awareness of these activities,
the SSRC hoped to document the existence in the distant American past of
a rationale for New Deal-inspired public works projects such as the Tennes-
see Valley Authority. In a memorandum on the SSRC project, Herbert
Heaton observed that it was felt desirable to destroy, if possible, the
popular notion that until the fourth of March, 1933, the United States was
the land of laissezfaire, and the alternate notion that governments, when they
have acted, have done so only in a regulatory capacity. Historians know that
both these notions are fantastically untrue; yet the story of the role of govern-
19. McCormick borrowed the concept of distributive politics from a well known typology
that political scientist Theodore J. Lowi devised in 1964 (ibid., 204). Prior to 1890, Lowi
declared, the distribution of resources by the government was "almost the exclusive type" of
national domestic policy. After 1890, Lowi added, regulation and redistribution also became
important. Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory," World Politics 16 (July 1964): 689.
Lowi's characterization of American public policy in the period before 1890 complements
the well known thesis of legal historian Willard Hurst that legal rule-making in this period was
fragmented, opportunistic, and market-driven. On this point, see Harry N. Scheiber, "Public
Economic Policy and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives," Wisconsin Law Review
(1980): 1184-85, and "At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The Contributions of
Willard Hurst," American Historical Review 75 (February 1970): 753. Scheiber's own interpreta-
tion of nineteenth-century legal doctrine highlighted the centrality of a distinctive "public
rights" tradition that was distinct not only from the legal instrumentalism of Hurst - and, more
recently, Morton J. Horwitz - but also from the rights-based jurisprudence of Edward S. Cor-
win. Scheiber, "American Constitutional History and the New Legal History," 347. See also
Molly Selvin, "The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920,"
Wisconsin Law Review (1980): 1403-42.
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ments in American economic enterprise has not been adequately studied and
presented.20
The SSRC was intent upon challenging the myth of laissez-faire and the
Handlins and Hartz obliged. In neither Massachusetts nor Pennsylvania,
they concluded, had laissez-faire gained many adherents in the period
prior to the Civil War.
Their studies, along with the related works they spawned, helped to
persuade many historians of the persistence, well into the nineteenth cen-
tury, of an activist tradition of government involvement in the economic
realm.21 What is less well understood is the extent to which their work
encouraged later historians to discount the influence of governmental insti-
tutions in the nineteenth-century United States. To understand this admit-
tedly puzzling turn of events, it is helpful to review briefly what the Hand-
lins and Hartz did and did not contend.
The Handlins' Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the
American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 traced the main currents of
public opinion toward economic policymaking in Massachusetts from the
American Revolution to the Civil War. Their subject, as they explained in
the preface to a revised edition, was less the workings of specific govern-
mental institutions than the "aspirations and intentions of the people of
the state." In the early republic, they observed, the people of Massachusetts
retained an allegiance to a seventeenth-century commonwealth ideal that
empowered public authorities to undertake a wide variety of tasks. This
ideal received fresh impetus from the American Revolution, which encour-
aged the citizenry of the newly established commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts to embrace a "vigorous conception of the state."22 For the next few
decades, policymakers closely regulated the chartering of corporations and
promoted a host of commercial undertakings that it assumed to serve the
public good. By mid-century, however, as the number of individuals and
groups who sought promotional opportunities multiplied, policymakers
found them increasingly hard to justify. The commonwealth ideal, in effect,
fell victim to its own success, and wras eventually supplanted by a more
purely regulatory, less overtly promotional, yet not necessarily less activist
vision, which the Handlins' termed liberalism to highlight its affinities with
popular currents of humanitarian reform.23 Though this liberal vision ex-
20. Herbert Heaton, "General Memorandum . . .," in Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Hand-
lin, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-
1861, rev. ed. (1947; Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 270.
21. For a survey of the scholarship fostered by the SSRC project, see Harry N. Scheiber,
"Government and the Economy: Studies of the 'Commonwealth' Policy in Nineteenth-Century
America," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (Summer 1972): 135-51.
22. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, xiv, xvii.
23. Ibid., 224, 228, 243. It is worth noting that at no point in Commonwealth did the
Handlins explicitly term the nineteenth-century polity a "liberal state." Rather, they called it a
"humanitarian police state," a "reform state," or a "regulatory police state" (ibid., 203, 229,
242). Later historians, however, settled on the liberal state tag - picking up, no doubt, on the
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tended the role of the state in protecting individual rights, it limited its
ability to shape the course of economic development.
Hartz told a similar story, but with a greater sensitivity to the institutional
setting. Hartz's main theme was the rise and fall of the theory of "mixed
enterprise," a once ubiquitous quasi-public, quasi-private rationale for ca-
nals, railroads, and other large-scale public work projects. "Though I have
not hesitated to explore relevant institutional problems at length," he con-
ceded, "I have been centrally concerned with this theory [of mixed enter-
prise] - the struggles out of which it arose, the doctrinal techniques by
which it was perfected, the opposing ideas which served to undermine it,
even the reasons why we in our own time have, as I believe, often failed to
grasp its importance."24 Not until the 1840s would critics attack the theory
of mixed enterprise in a principled way, and, even then, they refrained
from articulating a full-blown defense of laissez-faire, which would come
only after the Civil War.
Hartz was much impressed by the scale of these short-lived government
ventures:
Nothing in the economic policy of the colonial period could compare in
magnitude with the public works program; nothing in its regulatory policy
could compare with the immense variety of regulatory controls involved in
corporate regulation. . . . In the public investment area the state was pioneer-
ing enterprises distinctly in advance of private effort; we can scarcely blame
the state if the canals which it built were soon made obsolete by the emer-
gence of the railroad age.25
Yet he devoted far less attention to the rise of the mixed-enterprise ideal
than to its demise. In large measure, one suspects, this was because Hartz
considered it more important to explain why these projects were so soon
forgotten - and, thus, unavailable as precedents for New Deal era ventures
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority - than to consider how they distin-
guished the American polity in the early republic from the colonial polity
that it supplanted.
Neither the Handlins nor Hartz neglected the social setting in which
public policy was framed. Both, after all, pointed to social circumstances in
explaining why an activist vision of state power proved impossible to sus-
tain. Yet they displayed relatively little interest in the government's social
effects.26 The Handlins readily conceded the limitations of their study in
this regard. "We did not," they declared, "venture to assess the effects of
government action upon economic trends." It would have been useful -
they later conceded, in looking back upon their work - "to add an analysis
of whether the effects then perceived were actual or imagined." Still, they
Handlins's brief but suggestive reference to liberalism - and for this reason it is highlighted
here.
24. Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), xi.
25. Ibid., 294-95.
26. This point is made in MononJ. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), xiv.
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were quick to add, the absence of such an analysis did nothing to diminish
the accuracy of their description of what the people of Massachusetts
thought they saw during the period under review.27 If contemporaries be-
lieved a particular public policy to be in the public interest, the Handlins
saw little reason to question their judgment.
Hartz, to be sure, was highly sensitive to the extent to which public-
spirited rhetoric might conceal outcomes that were decidedly partial in
their results. "Not only did all institutional efforts to lend expression to the
Will of the People become enmeshed in party, sectional, and interest-group
mechanics," but many such efforts were intentionally designed to block the
government from taking positive action: "It was in the realm of administra-
tion, more clearly than anywhere else, that the age was misled by the
glamour of its democratic dreams."28 Yet Hartz, too, devoted more care to
describing the main contours of the theory of mixed enterprise than to
explaining how the Pennsylvania government shaped nineteenth-century
American life.
Given the preoccupation of the Handlins and Hartz with cultural percep-
tions and their focus on promotional ventures that proved short-lived, it is
perhaps not surprising that later historians often drew on their work to
support the claim that government involvement in the nineteenth-century
American economy was easily exaggerated.29 Both, after all, traced the fall
of a vision that promoted public involvement in economic development
and constrained private power, and the rise of an alternative - and, in some
ways, opposing - vision that limited government intervention and encour-
aged private power.30 And both explained this transition by pointing to
large-scale social processes originating in the wider society, rather than to
27. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, xvi, xiv.
28. Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic 'thought, 32-33.
29. It was partly for this reason, speculated legal historian William J. Novak, that the
commonwealth and mixed-enterprise studies have failed to challenge the "fundamentally
liberal-capitalist portrait of nineteenth-century America." Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996),
284 n.6. Of the scholars who have produced studies in the commonwealth tradition, only
Scheiber has challenged the primacy of instrumentalist considerations in the shaping of
nineteenth-century American law.
30. Scheiber, "Government and the Economy," 144. See also Robert A. Lively, "The Ameri-
can System: A Review Article," Business History Review 29 (March 1955): 81-96. The Handlins
and Hartz, Lively noted, "instead of eliminating the laissez-faire theme from analysis of public
policy . . . merely changed its chronology. Each assumed general adherence to the philosophy
after the mid-century point at which their studies ended. . . . The authors set out to describe
what the people of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania conceived to be the role of their govern-
ments, rather than to outline government activity; and with this definition of their work as
exercises in intellectual history, they very often relegated principal economic themes to the
position of supporting detail" (ibid., 82-84).
Lively exaggerated when he termed the Handlins' and Hartz's studies "exercises in intellec-
tual history." He was closer to the mark when he faulted them for treating government econom-
ic activism as episodic. For a view that stresses the continuity in government economic policy-
making throughout much of the nineteenth century, see George H. Miller, Railroads and the
Granger Laws (Madison, Wise: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971). See also Harry N. Scheiber,
"Public Policy, Constitutional Principle, and the Granger Laws: A Revised Historical Perspec-
tive," Stanford Law Review 23 (1970-1971): 1029-37.
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prior institutional arrangements or the decisions of administrators, policy-
makers, and other elites.
Equally influential in this regard were their synthetic overviews of Ameri-
can political development - the Handlins' Dimensions of Liberty, and Hartz's
Liberal Tradition in America - that traced the roots of American politics to
circumstances in the wider society.31
Among the first historians to adopt the Handlin-Hartz approach to Amer-
ican political development was Bernard Bailyn, one of Oscar Handlin's first
students at Harvard. Like the Handlins and Hartz, Bailyn was ultimately
less concerned with what the state did than with how influential contem-
poraries conceived of it. This was evident in the sweeping contrast he drew
between the expansive domain of the seventeenth-century British imperial
polity and the limited mandate of the nineteenth-century American liberal
state. In the eighteenth century, Bailyn contended, the social circum-
stances of British North America - including, above all, the availability of
enormous amounts of land - emboldened provincial assemblies to per-
form a range of tasks far greater than the British Parliament or the colonial
magistrates.32 How, then, Bailyn wondered, did this strong eighteenth-
century state became the weak state that the Handlins described?
The "Alienation of the State," Bailyn posited, was well underway by 1760
and greatly accelerated in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of
the American Revolution.33 Disturbed by the recent expansion of the Brit-
ish state and sensitive to the gap between the broad powers colonial magis-
trates presumed to exercise and the limited scope of their actual authority,
colonists rejected the notion that governmental institutions could be in-
struments of the public good. This rejection, in turn, became a key feature
of the American political tradition, which, Bailyn suggested, has always
denied that governmental institutions could act independently of the indi-
viduals over whom they presided. Bailyn's principal interest - observed
Jack N. Rakove, in a perceptive essay on Bailyn's oeuvre- was not the effects
of state power but, rather, the "weakening" of its authority and its inability
to define and advance "transcendent notions of the public good" that were
distinct from those sought by particular interests within the society. The
"liberal state of the Handlin's Commonwealth," Rakove added, was the "dis-
tant objective" that lay "just over the horizon" of Bailyn's own explorations
in the history of the long struggle between liberty and power.34
31. Oscar and Mary Handlin, The Dimensions of Liberty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1961); Louis Hartz, The Liberal 'Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American
Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955).
32. Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 25,
101-5.
33. Bernard Bailyn, "Shaping the Republic to 1760," in The Great Republic: A History of the
American People, ed. Bailyn, et al. (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1977), 1:133-34, 188-97,
209-16.
34. Jack N. Rakove, " 'How Else Could it End?' Bernard Bailyn and the Problem of Authori-
ty in Early America," in The Transformation of Early American History: Society, Authority, and Ideology,
ed. James A. Henretta, Michael Kammen, and Stanley N. Katz (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1991), 54-55, quotation on 55. Only occasionally did Bailyn explicitly refer to the concept of
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Bailyn's characterization of the eighteenth-century provincial assemblies
has yet to be subjected to a rigorous empirical test. It is, for example, by no
means certain that, as Bailyn contended, the legislative mandate of the
provincial assemblies actually exceeded that of the British Parliament. In
addition, it is hardly self-evident that the provincial assemblies in the colo-
nial era played a more conspicuous economic role than the state legisla-
tures in the early republic.35 Such caveats, however, have done litde to
deter historians from asserting that, at some point in the nineteenth centu-
ry, the American polity was transformed from an expansive and vigorous
commonwealth into a minimalist, noninterventionist liberal state. The
principal point of contention was the timing of this shift.
Consider, for example, Rowland Berthoff's Unsettled People (1971), one of
the first major surveys of American social history to feature the theme of
political declension. Berthoff, like Bailyn, was a student of Oscar Handlin,
and he endorsed his mentor's thesis regarding the abdication of social
responsibility. The "old commonwealth" of the colonial period - Berthoff
echoed Handlin almost word-for-word - in which private enterprise was
expected to be regulated for the "general welfare of the society," dissolved
into the nineteenth-century liberal state, which "recognized no common
social purpose greater than the sum of many private purposes of individual
farmers, merchants, railroads builders, and industrial entrepreneurs."36
Berthoff elaborated this view in 1973 in a widely cited essay that he co-
authored with John M. Murrin, another historian who found the declension
thesis compelling. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Berthoff
and Murrin contended, "governmental regulation of the economy, hitherto
accepted when required for the general welfare of the commonwealth, was
progressively abandoned, first in practice and finally and principle." Before
long, the government found itself "embarrassingly irrelevant" to the "social
needs and concerns of America in general." Much of the problem could be
traced to the continuing reliance of public figures on an increasingly anach-
ronistic rhetoric that was obsessed with political corruption, a "disembodied
Revolutionary rhetoric" that seldom bore any meaningful relation to social
realities, and which made the "hard problems" of the day impossible to
resolve. Not until after the Civil War, according to Berthoff and Murrin,
would Americans begin to speak sensibly about the relationship of power,
the liberal state in his writings; see Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes of the American
Revolution: An Interpretation," in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and
James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 25, 30. Bailyn did, however,
repeatedly refer to the concept in his teaching. Jack N. Rakove to Richard R. John, February 6,
1996. Rakove has recently affirmed Bailyn's position: "The United States was little less a confed-
eration when Madison died in 1836 than it had been when he set off for the Annapolis
conference half a century earlier" (Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996], 397 n.68).
35. Ibid., 212-13, 399-400 n.23. "For all that has been written about 'the rise of the
assembly' in America," Rakove observes, "its legislative output has not been rigorously analyzed"
(ibid., 213).
36. Rowland Berthoff, An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971), 170.
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politics, and society.37 Historians of the early republic should, therefore, give
up the study of governmental institutions and explore instead voluntary
associations, private life, and the "things left out" of traditional accounts.38
Murrin devoted particular attention to the limited range of tasks the
central government performed. Although contemporaries feared its rapid
expansion, the central government was a "roof" without "walls," a "midget
institution in a giant land."39 What it lacked, in particular, were durable
institutional links to the states. Critics who worried about the establishment
of enduring bonds between the central government and local and regional
elites had little to fear. In theory, the new government might be a "struc-
tural improvement" over the almost nonexistent administrative apparatus
of the 1780s; in practice, it exercised few new substantive powers. When
Americans declared their loyalty to the Constitution, they expressed less a
genuine nationalist sentiment than a nagging fear that the Founders' order
was so feeble that it could come crashing down at almost any time.40
By the 1970s, the irrelevance of governmental institutions in the early
republic had become something of a historiographical cliche. The 1790s,
posited Gordon S. Wood in a leading textbook account in 1977, were the
"most awkward decade in American history, bearing little relation to what
went on immediately before or after." Though the organizers of the domi-
nant Federalist party hoped to establish a strong central government, they
failed on virtually every count. Following the election of 1800, the victo-
rious Jeffersonian Republicans restored the government to the decidedly
minor position it had enjoyed during the 1780s. "During the opening three
decades of the nineteenth century" and particularly after Thomas Jefferson
retired from the presidency in 1809, the central government was "more
feeble than at any other time in its national history."41
Wood elaborated on his treatment of governmental institutions in his
37. Rowland Berthoff and John M. Murrin, "Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman
Freeholder," in Essays, 284, 278, 285-88. Berthoff and Murrin predicated their argument on the
assumption that colonial America was, in fact, a monarchical society undergoing a "feudal
revival" in which ties of personal dependence were becoming increasingly critical to one's
political and economic standing. This conclusion has been challenged for Massachusetts by
Richard L. Bushman, King and People, in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1985). Eighteenth-century Massachusetts, Bushman wrote, had a "monar-
chical culture" but was not a "monarchical society" (ibid., 85). Intriguingly, Bushman inter-
preted popular opposition to the British in the period after 1765 to the fear that the British
were about to create a monarchical society in America (ibid., 207).
38. Rowland Berthoff, "Writing a History of Things Left Out," Revinus in American History
14 (March 1986): 1-16.
39. John M. Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the
Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)," in Three British
Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1980), 425.
40. John M. Murrin, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,"
in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard
Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter, II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1987), 346, 347.
41. Gordon S. Wood, "Framing the Republic, 1760-1820," in Great Republic, 1:341, 366.
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Pulitzer-Prize winning Radicalism of the American Revolution, a sweeping sur-
vey of the main contours of American public life in the early republic.
During this period, Wood claimed, the traditional, hierarchical, monarchi-
cal, and deferential society of colonial America was transformed into the
modern, egalitarian, democratic, and individualistic society that has char-
acterized the United States to the present. The catalyst for this transforma-
tion was the American Revolution, the "most radical and most far-reaching
event in American history." For Wood, the "real heroes" and "principal
agents" of the age were not the Federalists, with their bold visions of gov-
ernmental power, but the thousands of ordinary Americans, such as the
backcountry Scotch-Irish immigrant William Findley, who challenged the
conceit that there was a public good different from the private interests of
the citizenry.42 For the first time in human history, Wood posited, the
interests and prospects of ordinary people, their "pursuits of happiness,"
now became the goal of society and government.43 From Wood's stand-
point, the Revolution was far more than a prelude to the establishment of
an independent polity, as it had been, for example, for political historian
Richard B. Morris, and cultural historian Linda K. Kerber. Rather, it was a
large-scale social process that explained the "deep change" in the early
republic's polity, culture, and economy.44
It has been noted that, in Radicalism, Wood underplayed several topics
new social historians considered of considerable importance. He said, for
instance, little about women and blacks. Yet, it is also true that Wood
shared the new social historians' preoccupation with the social origins of
political change.45 Like them, he took the coherence of American society
more or less for granted and treated political developments as the products
of antecedent social changes rooted ultimately in commercial expansion
42. Gordon S. Wood, "Equality and Social Conflict in the American Revolution," William
and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 51 (October 1994): 709, and id., "Interests and Disinterestedness in
the Making of the Constitution," in Beyond Confederation, 69-109.
43. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1992), 8.
44. Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (New York: Harper & Row,
1987); Linda K. Kerber, "The Revolutionary Generation: Ideology, Politics, and Culture in the
Early Republic," in \'ew American History, 42; Wood, "Significance," 12-18. The phrase "deep
change" was coined by David Hackett Fischer and can be traced back to his first book, The
Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New
York: Harper & Row, 1965). Fischer deployed the concept to refer to the organizational changes
in party behavior that political leaders set in motion with the victory of Thomas Jefferson in the
election of 1800. "There is no period in American history" - Fischer wrote, with reference to
the period between the election of 1800 and the War of 1812 - "in which fundamental change
proceeded with greater power, speed, and effect" (ibid., 199).
45. Though Wood is hardly a behavioralist, in an early essay, he did praise what he termed a
"behaviorist" perspective on the American Revolution. "Precisely because they sought to under-
stand both the Revolutionary ideas and American society" - Wood observed, in referring to the
scholarship of Merrill Jensen and his students - and notwithstanding their "crude conceptual-
izations," the "behaviorist historians of the Progressive generation" have "still offered us an
explanation of the Revolutionary era so powerful and so comprehensive that no purely intellec-
tual interpretation will ever replace it" (Wood, "Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolu-
tion," William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 23 [January 1966]: 32).
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and demographic growth.46 To highlight the impersonal character of these
changes, Wood sometimes resorted to the passive voice. Seldom did he
treat major political developments as the deliberate design of purposeful
individuals or groups and at no point did he locate the origins of these
changes in the public sphere.47
Similar propositions have been advanced by historians outside of the
Handlin-Bailyn orbit. For many, institutions were assumed almost reflex-
ively to offer a less promising research agenda than the exploration of long-
term patterns of social change.48 "It was important" - wrote social historian
Sean Wilentz, in 1982, in summarizing what remains today a widely held
view - "not to subordinate the study of social structures and relations to the
study of political institutions."49 Most conceded, with Wood, that the Feder-
46. Although Wood, in Radicalism, relied on the concept of American society as a whole as
his basic unit of analysis, he now questions the value of this concept for the colonial era. For
early Americanists, Wood wrote in 1995, the concept of society was no longer a viable organizing
theme:
So detailed has our understanding of the various bits and pieces
of society become, so numerous are the monographs on this
group or that local community, that historians have steadily lost
confidence in their ability to conceive of early American society
or even the society of a single colony as the proper area for
study.
Wood's observation raises the issue, which no one has yet explored systematically, of how and
why a relatively coherent American society eventually emerged. Gordon S. Wood, "A Century of
Writing Early American History: Then and Now Compared; Or How Henry Adams Got it
Wrong," American Historical Review 100 (June 1995): 694-95.
47. Several historians have touched on Wood's neglect of issues of agency. See, for exam-
ple, Jack N. Rakove, "Gordon S. Wood, the 'Republican Synthesis,' and the Path Not Taken,"
William and Mary Quarterly 3d sen, 44 (July 1987): 621. We ought to remember, Rakove con-
tended, that republican politics were not primarily an exercise in semiotics but rather, and
more elementally, a process by which "real historical actors" balanced and determined the
conflicting claims that have "clamored for protection and promotion in every phase of our
history" (ibid., 621).
48. Wood, "Significance," 4.
49. Sean Wilentz, "On Class and Politics in Jacksonian America," Revieius in American History
10 (December 1982): 52. Wilentz's theme was the social significance of the creation of mass
parties that were anti-ideological in character. In keeping with this theme, Wilentz treated
governmental institutions as more-or-less synonymous with political parties. The "ultimate prob-
lem" for political historians of the period, Wilentz wrote, was to determine the "social, ideologi-
cal, and political contradictions" in electoral politics that led to the demise of the party system
that had been organized around the Democrats and the Whigs (ibid., 59). See also his "Society,
Politics, and the Market Revolution, 1815-1848," in New American History, 51-71. For an elabo-
ration, with a particular focus on urban artisans, see Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and
the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
The relationship between social circumstance and party formation is a theme of the two
recent studies of Jacksonian politics: Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian
America (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990), and Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution:
Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). See also Melvyn
Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds., The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious
Expressions, 1800-1880 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996). Both Watson and
Sellers concentrate on the role of the so-called "market revolution" in shaping partisan loyalty
in the decades following the War of 1812. For works that focus on the role of slavery in shaping
party development, see William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-
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alists tried to establish a strong central government, but that, overall, they
contributed little of enduring value.50 Most contended that the mass of the
citizenry had few expectations about governmental institutions and litde
interest in public affairs. Ordinary Americans, wrote religious historian
Nathan O. Hatch, sought in the early republic "almost nothing from gov-
ernment institutions and almost everything from religious ones."51 Even
after the adoption of the federal Constitution, observed colonial historian
Jack P. Greene, the central government lacked the necessary administrative
capacity to shape events, while the mass of the citizenry remained preoc-
cupied with private pursuits, much as their ancestors had been in the pre-
Revolutionary era.52
Particularly influential in tracing political developments to social causes
have been legal historians. Few have gone quite so far as R. Kent Newmyer,
who, in a recent essay, termed the early constitutional order a "Trojan
Horse" of "radical social and economic transformation," set in motion by a
rising class of capitalist entrepreneurs.53 Yet many shared his view that the
early republic witnessed a revolution in legal rights that transformed the
judiciary from a check on the governing class into an agent of economic
development.54 Key figures in this tradition included Willard Hurst, who
wrote an influential series of books and articles that contended that the
nineteenth-century legal process encouraged the "release of energy" neces-
sary for economic growth.55 Though Hurst's argument was carefully nu-
1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Leonard L. Richards, "The Jacksonians and
Slavery," in Antislavery Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Abolitionists, ed. Lewis Perry and
Michael Fellman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 99-118; and William J.
Cooper, Jr., Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983).
50. See, for example, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision
of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984); John R. Nelson,Jr., Liberty and Property:
Political Economy in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987); and GaryJ. Kornblith and John M. Murrin, "The Making and Unmaking of an American
Ruling Class," in Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism,
ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb, 111.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 27-79. For one of
the most influential critiques of the role that earlier historians had assigned to the central
government in nineteenth-century American life, see Thomas C. Cochran, "The 'Presidential
Synthesis' in American History," American Historical Review 53 (July 1948): 748-59. See also
Wallace D. Farnham, "'The Weakened Spring of Government': A Study in Nineteenth-Century
American History," American Historical Review 68 (April 1963): 662—80.
51. Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1989), 14.
52. Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies
and the Eormation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); id.,
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the
United States, 1607-1788 (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1986).
53. R. Kent Newmyer, "John Marshall and the Southern Constitutional Tradition," in An
Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South, ed. Kermit L. Hall and James W.
Ely, Jr. (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 115.
54. R. Kent Newmyer, "Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the Ante-
bellum Origins of American Jurisprudence," Journal of American History 74 (December 1987):
820. See also Donald J. Pisani, "Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American
Economy," Journal of American History 74 (December 1987): 740—68.
55. Hurst's primary writings include Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-
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anced, and while he accorded the legal system a good deal more autonomy
than is often assumed, his work reinforced the widespread assumption that
legal changes were best understood as a product of developments occur-
ring outside of the political realm.56
Similar assumptions undergirded Morton J. Horwitz's Transformation of
American Law, 1760-1860, a sweeping reinterpretation of legal change dur-
ing the early republic in the industrializing Northeast. During this period,
Horwitz argued, a small yet purposeful class of entrepreneurs collaborated
with jurists, treatise writers, and other public figures to transform the legal
order from a guardian of vested rights into an instrument of capitalist
aggrandizement. Horwitz displayed considerable sympathy for the various
groups who lost out in this process and roundly criticized the Handlins' for
their failure to recognize the social costs this process entailed. Yet, like the
Handlins, Horwitz regarded the legal innovations that he chronicled not as
the product of pre-existing institutional arrangements, but, rather, of
changes originating in the wider society.
Historians were by no means alone in downplaying the importance of
governmental institutions in the early republic. Many political scientists
(including several who were sharply critical of the behavioralist premises
that had seeped into more than a few historical accounts), reached a
similar conclusion. Some went so far as to deny that the United States in
the early republic possessed a state at all. The absence of a state in the early
republic, wrote political scientist Walter Dean Burnham in a widely cited
letter, was the "chief distinguishing characteristic" of the American polity.57
Many echoed Matthew A. Crenson's provocative claim that the initial bu-
reaucratization of the central government was spurred not by the organiza-
tional imperatives of party strategists, as most scholars had previously as-
sumed, but, rather, by social dislocations originating in the wider society.58
Century United States (Madison, Wise: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956); Law and Economic
Growth: The Legal History of the Wisconsin Lumber Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1964); The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970); Law and Social Order in the United States
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977); and "Old and New Dimensions of Research in
United States Legal History," American Journal of Legal History 23 (1979): 1-20. For a bibliogra-
phy of Hurst's writings, see Wisconsin Law Reviexu (1980): 1131-32.
56. Scheiber, "Borderland," 744-56. See also Robert W. Gordon, "J. Willard Hurst and the
Common I.aw Tradition in American Legal Historiography," IMW and Soriety 19 (Fall 1975): 9-55.
57. Cited in Morton Keller, "Social Policy in Nineteenth-Century America," in Federal Social
Policy: The Historical Dimension, ed. Donald T. Critchlow and Ellis Hawley (State College, Pa.:
Penn State Press, 1988), 102.
58. Matthew A. Crenson, The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). For sympathetic glosses of Crenson's argu-
ment, see Michael Nelson, "A Short, Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy," Journal
of Politics, 44 (August 1982): 760—62; James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation
and the Limits of American Government (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 87-94; Donald B. Cole, The
Presidency of Andrew Jackson (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 240; and Wood,
Radicalism, 303-5. For a critique, see John, Spreading the Nexus, esp. 79-83, 241-52, 337 n.164,
337 n.166, 337 n.168; Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the Stale: The American Historical Experi-
ence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 68; and Edward Pcsscn, rev. of Federal
Machine, in Journal of Southern History 41 (November 1975), 553-54.
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Crenson's argument, long influential among historians and political sci-
entists, looked to social circumstances to explain major innovations in
governmental institutions, such as the introduction of bureaucratic proce-
dures in national public administration. Crenson termed the bureaucratiza-
tion of the civil government ajacksonian innovation, inverting Leonard D.
White's contention that thejacksonians opposed bureaucratic expansion by
subordinating the executive branch to the organizational imperatives of
the mass party.59 Only in this way could the Jacksonians restore the public
accountability that government officers had formerly taken for granted. In
particular, Crenson contended, a general breakdown of social restraints
during the 1820s leftjacksonian administrators such as Postmaster General
Amos Kendall little choice but to devise new administrative methods that
were ultimately codified in the Post Office Act of 1836, a centerpiece, in
Crenson's view, of Jacksonian administrative reform.60
Even specialists in the history of Congress saw little reason to highlight
the role of governmental institutions as such. "By any candid view" - wrote
James Sterling Young, in a major study of the Jeffersonian Congress - the
central government in the early republic was not "one of the important
institutions in American society."61 Young wrote in the 1960s, during the
heyday of behavioralism. He found it reasonable to assert that the principal
influences on congressional voting behavior were the bonds, rooted in
local residential patterns, that tied individual Congressmen to each other.
Congressmen voted by boardinghouse, Young concluded, rather than in
response to constituent pressures, party loyalty, or the goals of the execu-
tive branch. Not until the rise of thejacksonians, whose "functional signifi-
cance" was to link the government with the citizenry in novel ways, would
this situation change to a significant degree.62 Out of sight, Congress was
out of mind. Young conceded that his study was not meant to be compre-
hensive, and that, in particular, he had not undertaken an intensive investi-
gation of public policy.63 Given his behavioralist premises, it seems unlikely
that such an investigation would have altered his conclusion in a major way.
Having uncovered a correlation between social circumstances and voting
behavior, he assumed that his work was done.
59. Crenson's analysis echoed the conclusions of historian Lynn Marshall, who pro-
pounded a similar thesis, with a similarly exalted yiew of the Post Office Act of 1836, in a major
article that he published in the American Historical Review in 1967. Lynn Marshall, "The Strange
Stillbirth of the Whig Party," American Historical Review 72 (January 1967): 445-68.
60. Much depends, of course, on one's definition of bureaucratization. Yet, if one identi-
fies this process with formal job descriptions, meritocratic hiring and promotion procedures,
and the cultivation of a sense of esprit de corps, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Jacksonians slowed - and, to a significant degree, reversed - the largely successful bureaucratiz-
ation of the central government that had been vigorously promoted in the 1820s by energetic
and ambitious administrators such as Postmaster General John McLean.
61. James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1966), 27. See also Michael Nelson, "The Washington Community Revisited,"
Virginia Historical Revieiu 61 (Spring 1985): 189-210; and Allan G. Bogue and Mark Paul Mar-
laire, "Of Mess and Men: The Boardinghouse and Congressional Voting, 1821-1842," American
Journal of Political Science 19 (May 1975): 207-30.
62. Young, Washington Community, 35. 63. Ibid., xi.
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Young's disregard of policy helps explain why he had nothing to say
about the large and growing influence during the 1820s of federal-level
administrators such as John C. Calhoun, William H. Crawford, and John
McLean. In addition, it led him to exaggerate the isolation of national
politics from the public-at-large. "There is no evidence in the records of the
petitioning process of the Jeffersonian era" - wrote one historian, in a
pointed reference to Young's claim to the contrary - "to suggest a feeling
that the national government was distant and unapproachable."64
Such caveats by no means reflect a consensus across the board. Consider,
for example, Stephen Skowronek's brief but influential treatment, in Build-
ing a New American State, of American government in the early republic.
Best known as a "new institutionalist" approach to American political devel-
opment in the Gilded Age and Progressive era, Skowronek's study cogently
disputed the notion that the early American republic lacked a state. "The
early American state," he contended, "maintained an integrated legal or-
der on a continental scale; it fought wars, expropriated Indians, secured
new territories, carried on relations with other states, and aided economic
development."65 In addition, Skowronek effectively critiqued the behav-
ioralists' belief that state building was a "natural and adaptive reaction" of
governmental institutions to changing social circumstances. On the con-
trary, Skowronek contended that states changed, or failed to change,
through political struggles rooted in and mediated by pre-established insti-
tutional arrangements.66
But Skowronek also contended that the "great hallmark" of American
political development in the early republic was "neatly summarized in the
paradox that it failed to evoke any sense of a state."67 In this period,
Skowronek wrote, the American polity was a "state of courts and parties" in
64. Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Process of Government under Jefferson (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978), 210, 303, quotation on 303.
65. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American Stale: 'The Expansion of National Administra-
tive Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19.
66. Ibid., viii, ix.
67. Ibid., 3, 5. Skowronek based his own account of these developments largely on the
existing secondary literature, which, with few exceptions, reached a similar conclusion. See, for
example, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The United States," in Crises of Political Development in Europe
and The United States, ed. Raymond Grew (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978),
163-95. Skowronek's characterization of the American policy in the early republic as a state of
"courts and parties" has proved so influential among historians as well as political scientists that
it is worth noting that, particularly for the period before 1829, it rests on a thin empirical base.
During the past few years, historians have documented numerous instances of administrative
activism during the presidencies of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams. See, for example,
Noble Cunningham, Jr., The Presidency of James Monroe (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas
Press, 1996), and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence, Kans.:
University of Kansas Press, 1985). For a related discussion, see Charles C. Bright, "The State in
the United States during the Nineteenth Century," in Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in
History and Theory, ed. Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan
Press, 1984), 123, 134—43. Skowronek himself recently amplified his account of national politics
in this period to take into account this recent work. See, in particular, his suggestive survey of
the Monroe and Adams administrations in The Politics Presidents Make: leadership from John Adams
to George Bush (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 86-127.
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which administrative bodies lacked the capacity to shape public affairs,
jurists and party strategists directed the government, and Americans had
yet to be imbued with the loathing of bureaucracy that many see as a
ubiquitous feature of public life today.68 This institutional and cultural
setting, in turn, made the United States radically different from Europe,
where politics revolved around a central administrative apparatus that was
the cynosure of public affairs.
For a variety of reasons, a number of historians have found the above
accounts of the role of governmental institutions in the early republic
unpersuasive. Taken together, this scholarship can be termed the "new"
institutionalism in history, to highlight its affinities with the new institu-
tionalism in political science and to distinguish it from the "old" institu-
tionalism in history and political science that flourished during the open-
ing decades of the century.69 Thus far, the new institutionalism in history
lacks the self-consciousness of its political science counterpart. Yet its lead-
ing practitioners share a common research agenda that focuses not only on
discrete governmental institutions, such as courts, legislatures, or adminis-
trative agencies, but also on the configuration of institutions that gave the
polity its distinctive character. For them - as for the polity-centered histori-
cal sociologist Theda Skocpol and the historical political scientists Stephen
Skowronek and Karen Orren - governmental institutions are best con-
ceived of as agents with wide ranging social and cultural effects. Often they
focus not only on the goal-oriented activities of policymakers, but also on
the unintended and often unforeseen consequences of the organizational
network in which specific institutions are found.70
68. Skowronek, Building a Nnu American Stale, 3—35.
69. Among historians, recognition of the new institutionalism as a distinct intellectual
tradition dates back al least as far as 1965, when John Higham drew attention to it in an
influential study of the historical profession:
Deriving partly from studies in entrepreneurial and business
history and partly from contemporary American sociology, this
kind of history is less concerned with motives than with struc-
ture and process. . . . Perhaps we may call this the new institu-
tionalism; for it is bringing back to life a morphological study of
organizations, now freed from the formalistic, evolutionary em-
phasis of nineteenth century scholarship. (John Higham, Histo-
ry: Professional Scholarship in America [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1965], 231)
70. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Re-
search," in Bringing the Stale Bach In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda
Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21; Karen Orren and Stephen
Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism'," in The
Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin
Jillson (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 311-30; and id., "Institutions and Intercurrence:
Theory Building in the Fullness of Time," Somos 38 (1996): 111-46.
For a related discussion, see Mark H. Leff, "Revisioning U.S. Political History," American
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Although the "new" and the "old" institutionalism share a common fo-
cus, they are quite different in method. Old institutionalists typically con-
ceived of governmental institutions in a narrowly legalistic way and dis-
played a lively interest in the medieval and Teutonic origins of modern
institutional forms. In addition, they neglected social and cultural themes,
hardly surprising, since few historians had yet turned their attention in
these directions. New institutionalists, in contrast, distinguish sharply be-
tween theory and practice and dwell less on institutional origins than on
institutional effects. Though plainly influenced by, and, in some cases,
elaborating upon, the rich and growing literature on culture and society,
they break with these traditions by treating governmental institutions as
agents of change.71
New institutionalist scholarship on the early republic challenges three com-
mon assertions about American political development. First, it disputes the
claim that the government establishment of the 1780s had little enduring
influence on American life. Second, it raises questions about the character-
ization of the American polity in the early republic - and especially in the
period prior to the Jacksonian ascendancy - as a "state of courts and
parties." And, third, it contests the notion that the major political develop-
ments in the early republic are best explained by antecedent social causes.
New institutionalists challenge these accounts by reframing the question.
To compare the administrative apparatus that the Founders established
with the administrative apparatus today, they contend, is an anachronistic
exercise that is analogous to calling a horse a "wheel-less automobile." Far
more sensible are comparisons between the central government in the
early republic and the far weaker apparatus that existed prior to the fram-
ing of the federal Constitution. Policymakers in the early republic estab-
lished the necessary institutional mechanisms to guarantee the prosperity
and political stability of a burgeoning population that was scattered over a
vast and expanding territory. In addition, they permitted free migration
within the country (for everyone other than slaves), encouraged the rapid
settlement of the transappalachian West, and hastened an unprecedented
elaboration of the public sphere. None of these developments were even
remotely conceivable prior to 1775. Historians have been mistaken - de-
clares Allan Kulikoff, in summarizing this view - to downplay the signifi-
Historical Review 100 (June 1995): 829-53; William E. Leuchtenberg, "The Historian and the
Public Realm," American Historical Review 97 (February 1992): 1-18; id., "The Pertinence of
Political History: Reflections on the Significance of the State in America," Journal of American
History 73 (December 1986): 585-600; and Terrence J. McDonald, "The Burdens of Urban
History: The Theory of the State in Recent American Social History," Studies in American Political
Development 3 (1989): 3-29.
71. For a recent appreciation of scholarship in the old institutionalist tradition, see "The
Intellectual Legacy of the Johns Hopkins Seminary of History and Politics: Reconsidering the
Geneology of the Social Sciences," Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall 1994): 375-
408. See also David Brian Robertson, "The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in
American Political Science," Social Science History 19 (Spring 1993): 36.
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 369
cance of the establishment of the United States as a nation-state and the
"nationalizing processes" this event set in motion. These "state functions,"
Kulikoff wrote, "inconceivable when the colonies were still tied to the
British mercantile system, grew mightily in the new nation."72
Accompanying the new institutionalists' heightened appreciation for the
central government is a renewed interest in the political legacy of the
remarkable group of public figures - Federalist and Republican alike -
who dominated national politics in the years between 1787 and 1800. It is
not my intention to summarize this scholarship, which ranges widely over
topics in foreign as well as domestic affairs.73 Yet it is worth noting that, for
several historians, including some who would probably reject the new insti-
tutionalist label outright, the Federalists' contributions are no less notable
than those of their Republican antagonists. It is a mistake, argues Andrew
R. L. Cayton, in a study of frontier Ohio, to characterize the Federalists as
would-be aristocrats doomed to defeat in a democratic age. To be sure, the
Federalists were not particularly likable men: "Their efforts to create a
nation-state, with the attendant military and bureaucracy, offend the liber-
al and populist sensibilities of many late-twentieth century Americans."
Still, they were men with power, "very real power, however limited it may
seem in comparison with that of European states, and they used it to
achieve very specific ends."74 And their ideas "remained potent, largely
because the growing complexity of [the] economy and society had con-
vinced a significant group of men that an unregulated, liberal society
would produce only chaos and degeneracy."75
The new institutionalists' interest in the Founders' policy legacies is well
illustrated by the revival of interest in the Northwest Ordinance. This legis-
lation, passed in 1787 by the Continental Congress, provided for the order-
ly settlement of the territory north of the Ohio River on what was then the
American frontier. Historians have long recognized its consequences to be
far reaching, yet only recently have they systematically explored its political,
72. Allan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism (Charlottesville, Va.: Univer-
sity Press of Virginia, 1992), 109. See also Merritt Roe Smith, "Army Ordnance and the 'Ameri-
can system' of Manufacturing, 1815-1840," in Smith, Military Enterprise and Technological Change:
Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 40. Smith's essay
includes a suggestive discussion of how governmental institutions in nineteenth-century Ameri-
ca shaped cultural norms. See also his "Technological Determinism in American Culture," in
Does Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and
Leo Marx (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 1-35.
73. See, for example, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Eederalism: The Early
American Republic, 1788-1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and James Roger
Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1993).
74. Andrew R. L. Cayton, " 'Separate Interests' and the Nation-State: The Washington
Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West," Journal of
American History 79 (June 1992): 66.
75. Cayton, Frontier Republic, 32, 131. See also id., '"Separate Interests' and the Nation-
State," 39-67; id., "Land, Power, and Reputation: The Cultural Dimension of Politics in the
Ohio Country," William and Mary Quarterly 3d sen, 47 (April 1990): 266-86; and Cayton and
Peter S. Onuf, The Midwest and the Nation: Rethinking the History of an American Region (Bloom-
ington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990).
370 RICHARD R. JOHN
economic, and cultural effects.76 By establishing procedures to grant equal
status to the various political entities carved out of its domain - explains
Peter S. Onuf, in a recent synthetic account - the Northwest Ordinance \
helped insure that the United States would not become a colonial power \
and that it would expand in an orderly way. "Drafted at a time of sectional 3
division and constitutional crisis," the Ordinance "embodies a vision of a •]
more harmonious, powerful, prosperous, and expanding union. . . . The j
frontier would have to be transformed before the West could play its part in •!
a revitalized union, a transformation that required the exercise of authority j
- to maintain order, protect legitimate land titles, and foster economic <
development - by a strong national government."77 Though Onuf termed 5
this vision liberal, it had little in common with the unregulated pursuit of \
private gain that later historians would identify with the liberal state. Rath- \
er, it was designed to involve thousands and ultimately millions of would-be ;
landowners in a vast settlement scheme that policymakers assumed from
the outset would serve the public good.78
Another policy legacy new institutionalists have probed is the role of the
military in shifting the balance of power in the transappalachian West. The
role of the army in the 1820s and 1830s in relocating the Civilized Tribes
from the South Atlantic states to the west of the Mississippi is well known.
No less important was its role during the 1800s and 1810s in weakening the
hold of these tribes on their ancestral lands. Far more directly than land
hunger, concludes Richard White, in a recent study of U.S.-Indian relations
in the Great Lakes region, it was military exigency, in conjunction with
diplomatic and political considerations, that destroyed the "middle
ground" that prior to the War of 1812 made it possible for Indians, trap-
pers, and settlers to coexist.79
Most new institutionalists endorse the observation of western historian
Patricia Limerick that the central government has always played a vital role
in the West.80 Yet they are sensitive to its role in more settled parts of the
country as well. By establishing military armories in Springfield, Massa-
76. See, for example, Esmond Wright, Fabric of Freedom, 1763-1800, rev. ed. (1961; New
York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 168.
77. Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington,
Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987), xiii.
78. For a related discussion, see James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Chris-
tianity, Republicanism, and the Ethics of Early American Political Discourse," journal of American
History 74 (June 1987): 9-33.
79. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
80. Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West
(New York: W. W7. Norton & Co., 1987).
In the W e s t . . . it has been possible to see the future and to see
that it works - sometimes. Heavy reliance on the federal govern-
ment's good graces, the example of the West suggests, does
expose the two principals to substantial risk - to inefficiency
and mismanagement on the part of the benefactor and to re-
sentment and discontent on the part of the beneficiaries. To a
striking degree, the lessons of the problems of the American
welfare state could be read in the nation's frontier past, (ibid.,
89)
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chusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia, explains Merritt Roe Smith, in his
prize-winning study of early nineteenth-century military procurement, the
central government helped lay the groundwork for mass production.81
Notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of artisans unaccustomed to the
rigors of factory discipline, the armories enabled political entrepreneurs
such as John H. Hall to develop various machine tools and production
techniques that made them a "keystone of modern interchangeable manu-
facture" and one of the principal American contributions to world technol-
ogy in the nineteenth century.82 This achievement, Smith takes pains to
stress, was spurred more by political than economic considerations and, in
an age that preceded the coming of big business, lay beyond the capacity of
any nongovernmental entity. "What the government provided," Smith ex-
plains, "was an ongoing bureaucratic organization within which the new
technology - itself a bureaucratic phenomenon - could evolve."83
A third institution that new institutionalists have explored is the postal
system, which, in the early republic, quickly emerged as the linchpin of the
postconstitutional communications infrastructure and the central adminis-
trative apparatus of the early American state. The role of the postal system
in American public life in the early republic has been touched on by a
number of historians, and is the theme of a monograph Richard R. John
published in 1995. In 1828, the United States had 74 post offices for every
100,000 inhabitants; Great Britain, 17; France, 4.84 It is John's contention
that this contrast can best be explained as a product of the commitment of
American public figures to the creation of an informed citizenry, a goal
that emerged in the year immediately following the adoption of the federal
Constitution in 1787, and that marked a novel and in some ways radical
departure from colonial and revolutionary era assumptions about the
proper relationship between the government and the governed.85 Prior to
81. Historians of Great Britain have recently touched on broadly similar themes. See, for
example, Patrick K. O'Brien, "Political Preconditions for the Industrial Revolution," in The
Industrial Revolution and British Society, ed. O'Brien and Roland Quinault (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993), 124-55, and Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Econom-
ic History of Britain, 1700-1914, 2d (1969; London: Methuen, 1983), 31-75.
82. Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 324.
83. Merritt Roe Smith, "Military Entrepreneurship," in Yankee Enterprise: The Rise of the
American System of Manufactures, ed. Otto Mayr and Robert C. Post (Washington, D.C.: Smithso-
nian Institution Press, 1981), 95. For a related discussion of military influence in railroad
management, see Charles F. O'Connell, Jr., "The Corps of Engineers and the Rise of Modern
Management, 1827-1856," in Military Enterprise and Technological Change, 87-116.
84. John, Spreading the News, 5. See also Richard B. Kielbowicz, News in the Mail: The Press,
Post Office, and Public Information, 1700-1860s (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989).
85. Only after the adoption of the federal Constitution, as J. R. Pole explains, would a
"politics of trust," which presupposed that ordinary people possessed little knowledge about
political matters, be supplanted by a "politics of vigilance" that invested the citizenry with the
right to be more-or-less continuously informed about the affairs of state. The invention of this
new vision of governance, Pole adds, was distinct from, and even more conceptually daring
than, the institutionalization of the principle of political representation. "Neither political
representation nor popular government was a new idea at the time of the American Revolu-
tion," Pole explains: "What was new in the politics of the time was the use of representation as a
clearly defined institutional bridge between people and government. The two-way traffic over
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1787, the public sphere remained patrimonial, the monopoly, as it were, of
the tiny number of civic minded individuals who lived in close geographical
proximity to the seat of power. After 1787, no longer confined to a particu-
lar locality, it now spread itself throughout the vast territory over which the
American government claimed to exercise its jurisdiction.86 By 1828, the
postal network was basically complete, an event that would have major
consequences for American commerce and civic life.87
Congress institutionalized the creation of this "disembodied" public
sphere with the Post Office Act of 1792, which subsidized the transmission
of newspapers and other sources of information on public affairs, guaran-
teed the sanctity of personal correspondence, and created a mechanism for
the rapid expansion of the postal network from the Atlantic seaboard to
the transappalachian West. Though a few Federalists opposed certain pro-
visions of this act, their obstructionism was far less significant than the
widespread willingness of Federalists and Republicans alike to support such
an unprecedented and potentially destabilizing expansion in public access
to information about the affairs of state.88
the bridge was a traffic in knowledge. The men who devised the Constitution and the men who
wrote the Federalist Papers had not yet anticipated that the principle of accountability would
assume forms that would subject it to subject it to such intimate, yet public, investigation and
control. . . . Only through knowledge of the government of America could the people confide
to it their confidence and trust." Jack R. Pole, The Gift of Government: Political Responsiblity from the
English Restoration to American Independence (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1983), 140.
For a related discussion, see Michael J. Lacey and Mary O. Furner, "Social Investigation, Social
Knowledge, and the State: An Introduction," in The Stale and Social Investigation in Britain and the
United States, ed. Lacey and Furner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 8.
86. On the role of public policy in the creation of the public sphere, see James W. Carey,
Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 1-9, and
John, Spreading the News, chap. 2. See also id., "American Historians and the Concept of the
Communications Revolution," in Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in
Modern Business, ed. Lisa Bud-Frierman (London: Routledge, 1994), 98-110. For a discussion of
cultural values rather than institutional developments, see Richard D. Brown, The Strength of a
People: The Idea of an Informed Citizenry in America, 1650-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1996); id., Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-
1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic:
Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1990). See also John L. Brooks, "Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies: Voluntary
Association and the Public Sphere in the Early Republic," in Launching the Extended Republic':
The Federalist Era, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press
of Virginia, 1996), 273-377; and Thomas C. Leonard, Nexus for All: America's Coming-of-Age with
the Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 1.
87. Though Tocqueville recognized the significance of voluntary associations in American
public life, he overlooked the role of the central government in helping association organizers
to spread their message. On this point, see Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville Problem: Civic
Engagement in American Democracy," Social Science History (forthcoming).
Tocqueville's inadequate account of the central government, Tocqueville specialist James T.
Schleifer has observed, was the "basic error" of his discussion of the nature and future of the
American federation. Interestingly, Schleifer attributed this error to an uncritical reliance on
political commentators such as Massachusetts jurist Joseph Story, who deliberately exaggerated
the strength, ambition, and rights of the states. James T. Schleifer, The Making of 'Tocqueville's
Democracy in America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 111.
88. The expansion of the postal network was greatly facilitated by the petition process,
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It is a truism of the new institutionalism in political science that institu-
tions beget institutions; a case in point is the role of the postal system in
spawning the mass party.89 The expansion of the postal system in the
period prior to Jackson's victory in the election of 1828 was no less funda-
mental a precondition for the subsequent emergence of the mass political
party than the extension of the suffrage, rapid improvements in the means
of communication (which, of course, were also greatly facilitated by the
postal system), or the social dislocations spawned by the uneven course of
economic development. The existence of such a rich source of potential
political patronage, mostly in the form of mail contracts and postmaster-
ships, made the postal system an obvious target for ambitious public figures
intent on building a political organization that would have a life of its own.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, John McLean rose from political
obscurity at the time of his appointment as postmaster general in 1823 to
become a highly credible presidential contender by the time of his eleva-
tion to the Supreme Court in 1829.
The best overall index of the strength of governmental institutions in the
early republic was the extent to which they bound together in a national
community millions of Americans, most of whom would never meet in
person. More than any other single factor, it was the existence of this civic
infrastructure, in conjunction with the participation of ordinary Americans
in public life that it helped to encourage, that differentiated the modern
state that the federal Constitution brought into existence from the pre-
modern state that it supplanted.90 In conjunction with the various other
developments sketched in the previous paragraphs, this achievement helps
explain how the United States could double its size, triple its population,
and eliminate its national debt in the period between 1787 and 1835 with-
out seeming to increase the size and scope of its central administrative
apparatus. In no sense was this outcome an innocuous reflection of
changes originating outside of the political realm. Rather, it was a product
of deliberate political decisions that, however unpredictable their out-
comes, enabled public officers to command the allegiance of a large and
another important element of the postconstitutional civic infrastructure. To establish a new
post route, Congress required interested parties to petition Congress with a formal request.
Thousands of these petitions have survived and can be sampled at the National Archives. Many
were earnest, handwritten appeals. .As such, they constitute eloquent testimony to the relevance
of the government to everyday affairs and to the determination of the American people to
secure the benefits that only the government could confer. For a more extended discussion of
the petition process, see John, Spreading the News, 49-51, 173-74, 185-86, 189.
89. For a related argument, see Shefter, Political Parties, 68.
90. The role of the civic instrastructure in shaping political attitudes deserves more atten-
tion than it has thus far received. Political mobilization, as J.G.A. Pocock reminds us, can be a
"most powerful engine in determining political and historical subjectivity." J.G.A. Pocock, "The
Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject," American Historical
Review 87 (April 1982): 336. Such an inquiry would complement studies of the cultural conse-
quences of market growth. See Thomas Bender, ed., The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and
Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Imagination (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,
1992); and Thomas L. Haskell and Richard F. Teichgraeber, III, ed., The Culture of the Market:
Historical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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diverse population scattered over a geographically vast and culturally di-
verse domain.
New institutionalists have by no means confined themselves to exploring
the role of the central government in American life. Equally important are
a number of state and local studies that document how governmental
institutions shaped social and cultural practices in realms as otherwise
diverse as labor relations, citizenship, and family governance.91 These his-
torians underscore the Handlins' and Hartz's contention that, in this peri-
od, it was often at the state and local level that governmental institutions
had their most far-reaching effects. Yet they focus on practices that were
regulatory rather than promotional, and that were decidedly more perva-
sive and enduring than the commonwealth tradition in Massachusetts or
the mixed enterprise ideal in Pennsylvania.
Consider, for example, Hendrik Hartog's Public Property and Private Power,
a richly detailed study of the legal evolution of the New York City corporate
charter during the early republic. In the quarter century following the end
of the War of Independence in 1781, Hartog contends, this corporation
was transformed from a largely independent legal device into a "public
entity" that was legally subordinate to the newly created state of New
York.92 Hartog had originally assumed that city leaders resisted this change,
since it greatly restricted their legal autonomy. But he quickly discovered
that, on the contrary, they fully endorsed the expansive, republican ratio-
nale for policymaking at the state level that, following the war, became a
defining feature of public life. For Hartog, a central element of this repub-
lican rationale was its emphatically public character. Only after the War of
Independence, Hartog posits, and not before, would governmental power
become the "public monopoly of a centralized state."93 The results were
far-reaching. Soon the state government empowered the city of New York
to perform a variety of tasks that had formerly fallen outside of its domain,
ranging from the sweeping of streets and the confinement of pigs to the
orderly platting of uptown Manhattan.
Accompanying this "radical new belief" that public power could be used
to improve material conditions was the elaboration of a new public sphere
of civic responsibility conceptually distinct from the private realm of indi-
vidual aspiration.94 Support for this development was largely nonpartisan,
and endorsed by both Federalists and Republicans. Hartog terms this out-
91. Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Linda K. Kerber, "The Paradox of Women's Citizen-
ship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts," American Historical Review 97
(April 1992): 349—78; Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-
Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); and id., A Judgment for
Solomon: The D'Hautville Case and l^egal Experience in Antebellum America (Cambridge: Cambridge
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come "liberal" to underscore that, during this period, public figures estab-
lished a rigid demarcation in the political theory of city government be-
tween the public and the private sphere, and a "fairly unambiguous accep-
tance" of the primacy of a market economy. In no sense were these
developments carried over from the colonial era, as the Handlins had
assumed. In New York state, the commonwealth vision rose and fell in the
period prior to the break with the Crown. Hartog notes that,
It was then, in the years between the reception of the Montgomerie Charter
[1730] and the coming of the American Revolution, that the corporation of
the City of New York best approximated the commonwealth model of shared
enterprise and blurred public and private spheres.95
Among the administrative means that Hartog regards as particularly
important were the governmental mandates in Anglo-American common
law that have come to be known as the police power. The goal of city
leaders, Hartog explains, was to create a predictable and consistent envi-
ronment within which the private market economy could flourish: "Plan-
ning and the exercise of police powers, for all their violations of purported-
ly vested private rights, were central for that role."96
A considerably more detailed discussion of this common law heritage
can be found in William J. Novak's People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in
Nineteenth-Century America, a vigorously argued survey of the various regula-
tory responsibilities of nineteenth-century state governments. Unlike Har-
tog, and like the Handlins, Novak is more impressed by the cultural and
institutional continuities in regulatory policy between the colonial era and
the early republic than by the discontinuities set in motion by the War of
Independence and the Constitution. Yet he pointedly questions the as-
sumption, which goes back at least as far as Herbert Heaton, that these
regulatory policies were somehow less coherent, capacious, or consequen-
tial than the promotional policies studied by the Handlins and Hartz. Far
more important, and decidedly less "liberal" - that is, in the minimalist,
noninterventionist, and laissez-faire sense - were a plethora of state and
local regulations in realms as diverse as public safety, public health, and
public morals.97
Novak's analysis of these regulations also leads him to question Richard L.
McCormick's characterization of public policy in the early republic as pri-
marily distributive. In particular, Novak faults McCormick for suggesting
that government policymaking somehow evolved during the nineteenth
century from distribution to regulation. At the state level, the government
always exercised a wide range of regulatory powers. "The early republic,"
Novak explains, "far from being the formative era of an on-going tradition
of vested rights, due process, and judicial review, gave rise to potent consti-
tutional renderings of the public powers of the state."98
The common law vision of a "well-regulated society" dominated Ameri-
can social and economic policymaking throughout the early republic. The
95. Ibid., 156-57. 96. Ibid., 153-54. 97. Novak, People's Welfare, 284, n.6.
98. William J. Novak, "Common Regulation: Legal Origins of Sate Power in America,"
Hastings Law Journal 45 (April 1994): 1096.
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legal order enshrined was not, as Hartog would have it, merely the "lesser
and lighter" public half of a "perennial balancing act" between society and
government, individualism and communitarianism, private interests and
the people's welfare. Nor was it, as Berthoff and Murrin assumed, merely
the "fading vestige" of feudalism, mercantilism, or civic republicanism.
Rather, it was a "coherent, distinctive, and dominant legal-political dis-
course in nineteenth-century American life" whose "assumed and com-
monly accepted nature" only makes it that much harder to recognize."
Implicit in Novak's account is a sweeping critique of the historians who
have found the origins of the minimalist liberal state in the 1780s (Onuf),
around 1800 (Wood and Hartog), or during the Civil War era (Handlins
and Hartz). Rather, Novak posits its emergence in the period after Recon-
struction - just outside of the chronological scope of his study.
A final topic new institutionalists have investigated is the social and cul-
tural effects of the configuration, or structure, of the institutions that made
up the nineteenth-century American polity, including federalism and the
separation of powers.100 Historians, of course, have long recognized that
public figures devoted an enormous amount of time and energy to policing
the boundaries between governmental jurisdictions. Often, however, they
echoed progressive historians such as Frederick Jackson Turner and
Charles Beard, who treated these efforts as little more than a thinly veiled
rationalization for the competing claims of antagonistic social groups.101
The new institutionalists' sensitivity to the importance of structural con-
siderations is evident in Colleen Dunlavy in Politics and Industrialism, a
comparison of early nineteenth-century railroad policy in the United States
and Prussia. From a financial standpoint, the various state governments in
the United States were, at this time, more activist - or, conversely, less
minimalist, or liberal - than the central government in Prussia. During the
1830s, the Prussian central government contributed no more than 7 per-
cent of all the railroad capital in Prussia, while the various American states
contributed around 45 percent.102
To explain this contrast, Dunlavy distinguishes between political liberal-
ism, which she associates with a broad suffrage and responsive legislatures,
and economic liberalism, which she identifies with nonintervention and
laissez-faire. In the 1830s, Dunlavy finds, the United States had a liberal
polity and a nonliberal economy, while Prussia had a liberal economy and a
nonliberal polity. For this reason, American legislators initially made a far
99. Novak, People's Welfare, 49.
100. Here new institutionalists build on the insights of older scholars such as Scheiber. See,
in particular, Scheiber, "Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910."
101. Peter Onuf, "Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicenten-
nial Perspective," William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 46 (April 1989): 345. "Could it be," Onuf
asks rhetorically, "that the proper 'deconstruction' of the ratification debates lead back to
federalism - and the problems of the union - and not into the deeper structure of American
society?" (ibid., 357). See also id., The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdict ion al Controversies in
the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
102. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and
Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 51-55.
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greater investment in the new technology. Not only did they possess more
autonomy than their Prussian counterparts, but they lived in a more com-
petitive institutional environment, making them more vulnerable to public
pressure to speed the course of economic development. An analogous
logic, Dunlavy argues, helps explain why, in the United States, engineering
associations and railroad lobbying organizations remained highly decen-
tralized, while in Prussia their counterparts were national in scope. By mid-
century, however, with the expansion of the railroad beyond the geographi-
cal confines of individual states, the same structural features that had
facilitated the rise of government economic activism hastened its demise.
This was because public administrators now found themselves constrained
by the constitutionally mandated division of authority between the central
and state governments, and also by the relative weakness within the states
of the executive in relation to the legislature.
This institutionalist perspective on government economic activism dif-
fers in subtle yet significant ways from the competitive interest-group mod-
el set forth a half century ago by George Rogers Taylor, as well as from the
cultural approach of the Handlins and Hartz.103 For Dunlavy, and for the
most conceptually ambitious of the new institutionalists, the key to Ameri-
can political development is to be found neither in the distinctiveness of
American cultural values, nor in the interplay of its myriad interest groups,
but, rather, in the structuring presence of the state.104 An institutionalist
perspective, Dunlavy concludes, that is not sufficiently expansive to encom-
pass the structure of national political institutions, will miss the "culprit"
responsible for the "generally weak organization" of economic interests in
the United States and for their comparative strength in Prussia.105
"What is needed," as one new institutionalist astutely has declared, "is not a
political and institutional history that complements social and local history
but a political and institutional history reconceptualized and reorganized
in the light of what social and local historians have told us."106 There is
reason to suppose that at least some social historians are moving along a
parallel course. "The best social history," as one leading social historian has
recently observed, "attempts to integrate new research in institutional
structures with consciousness and ideology in a way that creates under-
103. George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston, 1951). For an appreciation of Taylor's achievement, see Harry N. Scheiber
and Stephen Salsbury, "Reflections on George Rogers Taylor's The Transportation Revolution,
1815-1860: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospect," Business History ReviewbX (Spring 1977): 79-89. Fora
critique, see Scheiber, "The Transportation Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism
and Public Policy," in Transportation and the. Early Nation (Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana Historical
Society, 1982), 5-7. Notwithstanding Scheiber's admiration for Taylor, Scheiber faults him for
exaggerating the role of social processes such as sectionalism in explaining opposition to public
works, while downplaying the role of principled objections rooted in constitutional law (ibid., 5).
104. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 4. 105. Ibid., 196.
106. Andrew R. L. Cayton, "Comment," in author's possession, 7-8.
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standing of a broader political process and of the tensions that ultimately
yield change."107
Perhaps the best statement of the synthetic potential of the new institu-
tionalism has been put forth by William H. Freehling in a recent overview
of scholarship on slavery and the Civil War. "Posterity," Freehling observes,
"thinks of pre-Civil War government as quaint, small, and devoted to laissez-
faire":
But just as Jackson's government moved Native Americans beyond the white
man's frontier, so governments, state and national, aided the dispersal of the
whites and the homogenization of the dispersed. The explosion of Americans
across the continent required a Transportation Revolution and government
helped provide it, building roads, financing canals, and enriching railroads
with gigantic blocks of public land. The knitting of spread-out communities
into a national culture required a Communications Revolution and govern-
ment again helped provide it, commencing a telegraph line, establishing a
far-flung postal network, giving printing bounties to national newspapers,
and distributing congressmen's national speeches. Here, the political and
social merged. The politics of moving blacks beyond the republic, the politics
of moving Native Americans beyond the Mississippi, the politics of moving
immigrants outside the voting booths, the politics of promoting and/or civil-
izing the westward movement - all this political history is important social
history.108
It would be a major missed opportunity if historians interested in govern-
mental institutions treated their subject as antagonistic to recent scholarship
in social and cultural history. It would be equally unfortunate - though, one
suspects, somewhat less likely, given recent scholarly trends - if they nar-
rowed their focus to the central government at the expense of the states and
localities. But until scholars bring these governmental institutions back in, it
will be impossible to explain fully the rise of the mass party, the voluntary
association, the national market, or a host of other major developments in
American life.
Among topics worth exploring are public finance, taxation, and the
administrative workings of state, city, and local government.109 Equally
neglected is the evolving cultural and social significance of political patron-
age and its role in American electoral politics, particularly after the Feder-
alist defeat in the election of 1800. Such an inquiry might reveal that, long
after 1800 - and contrary to the assertions of Berthoff, Murrin, and many
recent historians - the specter of political corruption remained a realistic
107. Kessler-Harris, "Social History," 180.
108. William W. Freehling, The Reintegralion of American History: Slavery and the Civil War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 152-53.
109. On public finance, see Dall W. Forsythe, Taxation and Political Change in the Young Nation,
1781-1833 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); W. Elliott Brownlee, Federal Taxation in
America: A Short History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9-46; and Richard Sylla,
John B. Legler, and John J. Wallis, "Banks and State Public Finance in the New Republic: The
United States, 1790-1860," Journal of Economic History 47 (June 1987): 391-403.
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concern.110 By almost any conceivable measure, the patronage that public
administrators and party organizers dispensed in the early republic was
significantly greater than the patronage that their colonial predecessors had
disbursed when the British American colonies remained under the Crown.
Though patronage had lost many of its traditional ties to gentility, and was
no longer a defining feature of personal identity, its disbursement re-
mained a vital public task that affected the lives of thousands of Americans
throughout the United States.
It should come as no surprise, then, that almost everyone who paid close
attention to American politics in the early republic treated the disburse-
ment of political patronage as a major concern. To this extent, as urban
historian Terrence J. McDonald has aptly observed, the "sense of stateless-
ness" that historically-minded political scientists such as Skowronek claim
to have discovered in the early republic, "was to a great extent invented in
mid-twentieth-century America."111 In the early republic, the possibilities
and the perils of governmental growth, far more than the hopes or fears
inspired by commercial expansion, defined the parameters of public dis-
course. Not until later would corruption become a shorthand for capital-
ism, even though many historians have mistakenly conflated the two.112 In
eighteenth-century Great Britain, as J.G.A. Pocock has observed, the "revo-
lutionary class" was not the trading bourgeoisie, but soldiers, placemen,
and financiers, all of whom were dependent in one way or another on the
public purse.113 To an extent that few students of the early republic have
fully realized, including Pocock himself, this also held for the United States
in the early republic.114
Scholars would also do well to reconsider the history of internal improve-
ments. For too long this topic has been hindered by the questionable
assumption that public works projects lacked a broad popular mandate,
and, thus, could be plausibly dismissed as class legislation for the favored
few. "There was no spontaneous outpouring of shock or dismay," observes
economic historian John Lauritz Larson, following President John Quincy
110. Paul Bourke and Donald DeBats, "Identifiable Voting in Nineteenth-Century America:
Toward a Comparison of Britain and the United States before the Secret Ballot," Perspectives in
American History 11 (1977-1978): 275. Since voting in the early republic was open, Bourke and
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at first-hand; Bourke and DeBats, Washington County: Politics and Community in Antebellum America
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Adams's expansive justification for internal improvements in his first annu-
al message, because this message "promised popular programs.""5 Given
the popularity of public works spending, historians may well want to re-
open the question of why these projects went down to defeat. One possible
area of research would focus on the deliberate obstructionism of proslavery
Southerners. Following the victory of Andrew Jackson in the election of
1828 and the subsequent stripping of the administrative capacity of the
central government, policymakers lost the only plausible administrative
mechanism that could conceivably have rid the country of slavery in a way
short of war. Was this, one wonders, entirely a matter of chance?116
In conclusion: While the new institutionalists have challenged a number
of well entrenched notions about the relationship between politics and
social change, their working assumptions are by no means altogether novel.
Indeed, they share a certain unmistakable affinity with the world view of
the public figures whose activities they recount. Prior to the 1880s, in-
formed contemporaries took it for granted that politics best explained
large-scale social processes such as the distribution of wealth.117 Only when
historians subject the concept of society to the same degree of scrutiny that
they have lavished on the concept of the state will it become possible to
explore fully the cultural and institutional dimensions of American self-
understanding in its formative years.118 At the very least, such a perspective
ought to increase our appreciation of achievements, failures, and missed
opportunities of the statesmen, party organizers, and ordinary men and
women who together fashioned the governmental institutions that laid the
foundation for the modern United States.
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